78-09-A1

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Normalization

Transcript One result of the Brzezinski trip to Peking, in May seems to be an accelerated timetable by the Carter administration to complete the so-called "normalization" of diplomatic relations with Peking. The purpose of all this, we're led to believe, is to checkmate Russian. expansionism and to make the Soviets more agreeable at the bargaining table. Whether the strategy works remains to be seen, but it is a chancy game. Why wouldn't the Russians be just as likely to insist on better arms terms for themselves on the grounds that a new U.S.-Peking alliance would be a case of two against one. And, lest we forget, the leaders of Communist China say over and over again in their speeches that the United States is simply the lesser of two evils. We have something they want: technology and sophisticated industrial equipment. Once they get it so they can industrialize by the end of this century, what will they do then? Meantime, it's beginning to look as if our government is willing to pay the price Peking has put on "normalization", though it is hard to see what is in it for us. Their price has three elements. These are, that we break relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan; that we break our 24-year-old mutual security treaty with that government; and that we withdraw all military advisers from Taiwan. Following the Brzezinski trip, word comes that the administration has been quietly promoting its own "three conditions" for "normalization". Mr. Carter is said to have told some members of the Trilateral commission last month that the U.S. will insist on maintaining trade and military assistance with Taiwan; that it would set up a trade office in Taipei; and that it would ask the Communists to make it clear they would not use force to gain control of Taiwan. As to the last point, the Communist Chinese are in no position to attack Taiwan militarily at this time. Taipei has more to fear from economic strangulation. By "normalizing" relations with Peking we would be acknowledging that Taiwan was merely a province under Peking's jurisdiction. What then if Peking were to impose impossible restrictions on outsiders wanting to trade with Taiwan. We could complain, but legally it would be none of our business. Some China scholars in this country are so anxious to complete the so-called "normalization" that one of them, a well known law professor, has put forth a legal formulation to scuttle our treaty with the free Chinese. He says that if we recognize Peking the treaty with Taipei would simply lapse since we would no longer have formal relations with its government. It we treat an ally that way, what good is our word anywhere? What will the Japanese think of our reliability, or the Israelis, who rely on our moral commitment and have no defense treaty with us? One rumor making the rounds is that Mr. Carter may announce "normalization" by next February. Now that his former advertising man is a sort of Secretary of Symbolism in the White House, would it surprise you if they picked February 28, the anniversary of the signing of the Shanghai Communique? This is Ronald Reagan. Thanks for listening.		Details Batch Number 78-09-A1 Production Date 06/27/1978 Book/Page Online PDF Audio Youtube? No
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